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INTRODUCTION
A prosecutor is handed a complaint charging harassment and a
harrowed woman follows him into his office. The charges stem from
an ex-boyfriend repeatedly making threatening calls to her over a
recent weekend. She saved a voicemail where her ex-boyfriend said
he expected to see her at a funeral. She then explains that two weeks
earlier, he showed up at her door uninvited, called her names, and
threatened her life before leaving when she threatened to call the
police. On more than a dozen other instances over the past six
months, she says he followed her by car, called and hung up, or
waited outside her house. She can’t give exact dates, and adds that
when they were dating a year earlier, her ex-boyfriend hit her but she
never reported it.
The prosecutor knows that the defendant is entitled to a jury trial
on the harassment charge, reducing that charge is not an option, and
it is a weak case. Having spoken with defense counsel, he knows that
the defendant is not interested in taking any plea that would involve
an order of protection for the complainant, and that he can’t rightly
plead the case without securing an order of protection. The case
needs to go to trial, and yet it will require a Herculean feat to
convince a jury to convict a man of harassment on the sole basis of a
few phone calls and an ambiguous voicemail.
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In order to convict the defendant, the prosecutor will need to show
the jury evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged conduct towards
the complainant to explain their relationship and the hostility of the
phone calls. The People will be unable to prove the defendant’s
intent to terrorize without evidence of his prior phone calls and
conduct towards the complainant. The complainant’s memory is
unclear, however, and she does not provide specific details or dates
for the defendant’s prior conduct. The prosecutor informs the
complainant of the prospects at trial. He knows that the credibility,
detail and likelihood of the prior conduct will determine whether the
prior bad acts evidence will be admitted in his jurisdiction.1 Whether
the prior bad acts are clear and particularized may therefore decide
the case before it is even begun. The prosecutor never suggests that
the complainant do anything other than be truthful; the prosecutor
does not even tell the complainant about the law on prior bad acts
evidence’s admissibility, obviating any incentive for the complainant
to tailor her testimony. Nonetheless, the prosecutor tries to help the
complainant remember more, probing deeper and deeper into the
dates and circumstances of the prior events:
When the defendant followed you, were you working at the time?
Would you have remembered if something unusual happened on
your regular commute?
When the defendant struck you, did he bruise you?
Would someone at work have noticed if you were bruised?
Would the bruise have been covered up because it was cold outside
(i.e., winter)? And so on.

While interviewing a witness, such as this hypothetical
complainant, the prosecutor balances trying to gather information by
probing the extent of the witness’s recollection of past events with
trying not to influence the witness’s memory by introducing
distortions.2 The goal is ultimately to elicit as strong a recollection as
the witness’s memory will support so that the witness may testify
confidently and honestly, and so that the prosecutor will be able to
establish the necessary foundation for the evidence. In the above
example, the issue is elucidating the victim’s memory of uncharged
prior bad acts by the defendant.

1. See infra notes 162–72 and accompanying text.
2. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 829, 851 (2002).
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Prior bad acts evidence is any evidence or testimony regarding acts
by the defendant that is not included in the conduct which brought
about the criminal charges or civil claim.3 This Note examines which
standard of proof should apply to the commission of prior bad acts for
their admission in criminal cases. The focus is on criminal cases
because of the unique responsibilities of prosecutors, particularly in
that they do not represent individual clients and instead seek
convictions on behalf of the government.
Such evidence is generally referred to as “prior bad acts”4 evidence,
“uncharged misconduct”5 evidence, or evidence of a “crime, wrong,
or other act.”6 Prior bad acts evidence is governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence (FRE) 404(b) in federal courts, and by varying approaches
in state courts.7 Jurisdictions have adopted different standards of
proof for the commission of prior bad acts: some require that the
prior bad acts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and
convincing evidence; others, including the Supreme Court, require
only that a hypothetical reasonable juror be able to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prior bad acts were
committed by an opposing party.8 Jurisdictions that require a greater
showing of proof tend to argue that a higher standard is necessary to
reduce the risk of prejudice.9 In determining whether prior bad acts
have been sufficiently proven, courts consider the detail of the
testimony alleging the prior bad acts.10
The purpose of this Note is to further the debate among
jurisdictions as they decide what standard of proof to adopt for prior
3. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
4. See, e.g., Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *1 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2003).
5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 594, 597 (Wyo. 1993).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
7. FED R. EVID. 404(b) states:
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character. . . . This evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.
Compare id., and LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 1104, with State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d
1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997) (rejecting the Federal Courts’ approach to prior bad act
admissibility as laid out in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)). For a
discussion of the varying approaches states employ, see infra Part I.D.
8. See infra notes 100–44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 167–74 and accompanying text.
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bad acts evidence by discussing a source of prejudice to defendants
that courts have not addressed. Specifically, this Note argues that
jurisdictions should consider the risk of prejudice created by witness
preparation as they decide the appropriate standard of proof for the
commission of prior bad acts.11 A higher standard of proof can
incentivize more probing of a witness’s incomplete memory during
witness interviewing and preparation, which introduces a risk of false
testimony through memory distortions that can outweigh the risk of
prejudice from juries hearing evidence of prior bad acts that cannot
be proven.12 As a result, this Note argues that jurisdictions should
adopt a minimal standard of proof to limit the risk of prejudice to the
defendant.
The risk of prejudice created by witness preparation through the
genesis of false memories is certainly not limited to instances when
prosecutors and witnesses discuss a defendant’s commission of prior
bad acts. Insofar as witness preparation creates such false testimony,
it implicates, arguably, every single rule of evidence.13 This Note,
however, focuses solely on the interplay of the prejudice of witness
preparation and the standard of proof for prior bad acts evidence for
two reasons. First, the latter is an unsettled area of law and is ripe for
analysis. Second, this Note engages this one rule of evidence to draw
attention to how the prejudicial risks of witness preparation may be
included in future debates that reconsider other rules of evidence.14
This Note is concerned with the prejudicial risks of witness
preparation that result when a defendant is confronted by witnesses
who have developed false memories about prior bad acts because of
extensive witness preparation.15 Such witnesses are more difficult to
11. For a discussion of the risks of unintentionally creating false testimony
through witness preparation, see infra Part II.
12. See infra notes 164–70 for a discussion of how a higher standard of proof
implicates witness preparation, infra Part I.C.2 for a review of the prejudice created
by prior bad acts evidence, and infra Part II for a discussion of the risks creating false
testimony through witness preparation.
13. See generally Bruce A. Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How Rules of Evidence
Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699 (1992) (discussing the
relationship between the rules of evidence and witness preparation).
14. This Note does not argue that more prior bad acts evidence should or would
be admitted because of this change. Rather, instead of focusing on proof of
commission, courts should continue to limit the admission of prior bad acts evidence
by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial impact. See Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
15. This Note assumes that in jurisdictions that require a higher standard of proof,
attorneys are aware that detail has a corroborating effect for prior bad act allegations
and that attorneys therefore ask their witnesses more probing questions to elicit
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cross-examine16 and may seem more convincing to the jury—all as the
result of a rule17 that is intended to reduce prejudice. This Note will
review legal scholarship and social psychology research to discuss
how probing questions during witness interviews and preparation can
introduce prejudice by creating false memories and memory
distortions in the minds of witnesses.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history and nature of the rules of
evidence surrounding prior bad acts evidence. Part II will discuss
witness preparation and its risk of prejudice, particularly in the
context of prior bad acts evidence. Part III will argue that state courts
that have rejected the federal courts’ approach to prior bad acts
admissibility should instead adopt the federal approach to minimize
the risk of prejudice to the defendant.
I. PRIOR BAD ACTS A DMISSIBILITY AND THE INCENTIVES IT
CREATES
A. Origins of the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence and Its
Exceptions
The bar against evidence of a defendant’s uncharged prior bad acts
has been in existence at common law in some form since the
seventeenth century.18 Initially, it emerged as a reaction to treason
prosecutions in the “Star Chamber” in Great Britain.19 In 1810, the
judges in Rex v. Cole held that “in a prosecution for an infamous
crime, an admission by the prisoner that he had committed such an
offence at another time and with another person, and that he had a
tendency to such practices, ought not to be admitted.”20 Rex v. Cole

specifics from their witnesses’ memories that can increase the likelihood of the
evidence’s admissibility. Obviously, if prosecutors’ behavior is not influenced at all
by the rules of evidence, then changes to the rules of evidence will have no impact on
witness preparation techniques. For a discussion of how the rules of evidence and
ethics affect witness preparation, see infra Part I.C.1. And for a discussion of how the
admissibility of prior bad acts testimony is affected by its specificity, see infra Part
I.E.
16. See infra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
17. The higher standard of proof of commission of prior bad acts evidence.
18. See Christopher M. Joseph, Other Misconduct Evidence: Rethinking Kansas
Statutes Annotated Section 60-455, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 145, 151 (2000) (citing
Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced
in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716–17 (1981)).
19. See id.
20. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46
HARV. L. REV. 954, 959 (1933).
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has been cited as the source of the bar against character and prior bad
acts evidence,21 but decisions to that effect had taken hold in
American courts as early as 180722 and the bar ultimately became a
staple of American jurisprudence.23
In People v. Molineux, a highly influential decision in 1901, the
New York Court of Appeals discussed the bar against prior bad acts
evidence and laid out five exceptions under which prior bad acts were
admissible.24 The court began by adducing rationales for the general
bar against prior bad acts evidence, stating that unlike countries such
as France, where the entirety of the accused’s life was subject to
examination, “it is not permitted to show [the accused’s] former
character or to prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the purpose
of raising a presumption that he who would commit them would be
more apt to commit the crime in question.”25 Further, the court
reasoned that:
[i]t would be easier to believe a person guilty of one crime if it was
known that he had committed another of a similar character, or,
indeed, of any character; but the injustice of such a rule in courts of
justice is apparent. It would lead to convictions, upon the particular
charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and
to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce a conviction for a
single one.26

Despite this potential for prejudice, the prohibition on prior bad
acts evidence was not absolute.27 After categorizing previous courts’
admissions of prior bad acts evidence, Judge Werner, in his majority

21. See id.; see also David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence
Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161,
1170 (1998).
22. See Leonard, supra note 21, at 1171; see also People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286,
293 (N.Y. 1901) (“The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the
state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment . . .
aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . This rule, so universally
recognized and so firmly established in all English-speaking lands, is rooted in that
jealous regard for the liberty of the individual which has distinguished our
jurisprudence from all others, at least from the birth of Magna Charta.”).
23. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1171–72.
24. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 294 (citing Coleman v. People, 55 N.Y. 81, 90 (1873)).
27. See Randolph N. Jonakait, People v. Molineux and Other Crime Evidence:
One Hundred Years and Counting, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (2002); see also
Molineux, 61 N.E. at 295–96 (citing Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y. 424 (1880); Coleman v.
People, 58 N.Y. 555 (1874); Copperman v. People, 56 N.Y. 591 (1874)).
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opinion, identified several exceptions to the prohibition.28 The
majority in Molineux held that the bar against evidence of prior bad
acts did not apply when the evidence helped establish: the
defendant’s motive; his intent; that the commission of the charged
conduct was deliberate and thereby the absence of accident or
mistake by the defendant; the defendant’s identity; or that the
defendant had committed prior bad acts as a part of a larger criminal
enterprise which included the charged conduct, uniting the charged
and uncharged conduct in a common scheme or plan.29 Prior bad act
evidence was ruled inadmissible unless it served one of these
enumerated purposes.30
Judge Parker, concurring in the judgment, but dissenting as to the
discussion of prior bad acts evidence, wrote an arguably even more
influential opinion in Molineux.31 Judge Parker eschewed the five
exceptions to the general bar against prior bad acts evidence,
reasoning that no precedent had suggested that there was a finite set
of clearly defined exceptions.32 Instead, Judge Parker argued that the
prohibition against prior bad acts evidence focused on preventing the
evidence from being offered to prove nothing more than a criminal
propensity, and that the evidence should be admissible if it was
otherwise relevant to proving the charged crime.33
While Judge Werner’s majority opinion remains good law in New
York,34 the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, used Judge
Parker’s inclusive model of admissibility as the template for Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs prior bad act admissibility.35

28. See Jonakait, supra note 27, at 30.
29. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 294.
30. Interestingly, the entirety of Judge Werner’s substantial discussion of prior
bad acts evidence was dicta, as the appeal was decided on the grounds of improperly
admitted hearsay evidence. Junakait, supra note 27, at 27.
31. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314 (Parker, J., concurring) (“Do the facts constituting
the other crime actually tend to establish one or several elements of the crime
charged? If so, they may be proved. . . . [I]t has never been held by any court of
responsible authority that the people cannot prove the facts constituting another
crime, when those facts also tend to establish that the defendant committed the crime
for which he is on trial.”); see also Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s
Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (2005).
32. See Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d 32 (2001).
35. See Reed, supra note 31, at 204–12.
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Forty-one states have since adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
with limited modifications.36
B.

Modern Jurisprudence and the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts
Evidence

1.

Huddleston v. United States

Since People v. Molineux, jurisdictions have gradually evolved and
expanded the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. For example,
in the early twentieth century, Ohio required that prior bad acts be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.37 The Ohio Supreme Court
overturned that requirement in 1923, thereafter requiring only that
the proof of commission be “substantial.”38 The New York Court of
Appeals, which had identified five categorical exceptions to the
prohibition of prior bad acts evidence in Molineux, has similarly
expanded admissibility. Additional exceptions to the prohibition
against prior bad acts evidence have been identified39 for evidence
that establishes the nature of the relationship between the victim and
the defendant,40 that is inextricably interwoven with the charged
conduct,41 that is necessary to complete a narrative of conduct,42 or
that is necessary as background information.43
Despite these incremental changes broadening the admission of
prior bad acts, however, the nation’s most significant single change
resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston v. United
States in 1988.44 Prior to the Court’s decision, the circuits were split
on whether Rule 404(b) required trial courts to make a preliminary
finding that “the Government has proved the ‘other act’ by a

36. See Reed, supra note 31, at 212.
37. See Baxter v. State, 110 N.E. 456, 458 (Ohio 1914).
38. Scott v. State, 141 N.E. 19, 26 (Ohio 1923).
39. See People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1987).
40. See, e.g., People v. Valath, 867 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 2008).
41. See, e.g., People v. Higgins, 784 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (App. Div. 2004).
42. See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (N.Y. 2001).
43. See, e.g., People v. Sceravino, 598 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (App. Div. 1993). A
common use of this exception is for evidence of prior conduct that resulted in an
order of protection (i.e. a restraining order). This evidence is presented to explain a
charge of criminal contempt against the defendant for violating the order. See, e.g.,
People v. Rock, 882 N.Y.S.2d 907, 907 (App. Div. 2009).
44. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).

TORTORA_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1502

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

7/14/2013 10:41 PM

[Vol. XL

preponderance of the evidence before it submits the evidence to the
jury.”45
Guy Huddleston, the defendant, was charged with selling stolen
goods and possessing stolen property, both in interstate commerce.46
He was accused of trying to sell a shipment of stolen tapes.47 The
issue was whether he knew that the tapes were stolen.48 The
Government sought to introduce evidence of two prior similar
incidents in which the defendant sold goods at a drastic markdown.49
The Government argued these sales, one of which was of televisions
from the same “suspicious” source as the stolen tapes, indicated that
the goods in all three sales were stolen.50 The Government argued
that the other acts, then, were relevant to showing that the defendant
had knowledge that the tapes in question were stolen because he had
sold similar, presumably stolen, goods in the past.51 The relevance,
and thus admissibility, of the prior sales ultimately turned on whether
goods in the prior sales were stolen.
The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior sales, but the
Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, concluding that the
Government had the burden to prove that the goods sold in the prior
sales were stolen by a clear and convincing standard of evidence.52 In
a rehearing, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a trial court could admit
prior bad act evidence “if the proof shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant did in fact commit the act.”53
The defendant argued to the Court that prior bad acts evidence
should be subject to a preliminary fact finding by a trial court
pursuant to FRE 104(a), thus requiring that a judge find that the prior
bad acts were proven by a standard of proof at least as high as a
preponderance of the evidence.54 The Court rejected this argument,

45. Id. at 682.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 683.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 686.
51. Id.
52. See United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986).
53. United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir. 1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
54. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”);
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687.
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holding that a trial court only needed to screen the evidence pursuant
to FRE 104(b).55 This determination marked a significant change for
prior bad act admissibility.
For background, the Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish
between two types of preliminary facts: those determining the
competence of evidence and those determining its conditional
relevance.56 Preliminary facts determining competence receive a
preliminary fact-finding by a trial judge under FRE 104(a).57
Preliminary facts determining relevance do not receive a preliminary
fact-finding by a court, but are submitted to the jury, subject to
admission under FRE 104(b).58 An example of a preliminary fact that
determines, or conditions, the competence of evidence is where a
party seeks to offer a hearsay statement pursuant to the excited
utterance exception to the bar against hearsay evidence.59 In that
case, the preliminary fact determining competence is whether the
statement was an excited utterance.60 Pursuant to FRE 104(a), a
judge would perform a preliminary fact-finding and hear the evidence
as to whether the speaker of the out of court statement was
experiencing nervous excitement. The judge would then determine if
the statement was admissible under the excited utterance hearsay
exception pursuant to 104(a).61 An example of a preliminary fact
which conditions the relevance of evidence would be where a party
seeks to introduce a statement to prove that the intended audience of
the statement was put on notice. Naturally, the statement is only
relevant if the audience of the statement actually heard it, and thus
was put on notice.62 Pursuant to 104(b), a judge would allow the
statement to be entered into evidence and submitted to the jury if,
given all the facts surrounding the statement, a reasonable juror could

55. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the
proof be introduced later.”); Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689–90.
56. See FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee’s note.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See 1 EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:6
(2012); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
60. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 2:6.
61. See id.
62. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note.
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find that the statement was heard by a preponderance of the
evidence.63
In Huddleston, the Court held that under FRE 104(b), a trial court
should examine all of the available information and submit the prior
bad acts evidence to the jury if the court concludes that a reasonable
juror would be able to find any necessary conditional fact by a
preponderance of the evidence (in Huddleston, that the prior sales
were of stolen goods).64 Importantly, a trial court is not to consider
the credibility of the evidence when it considers the evidence’s
admission.65
The Court held that a fact-finding pursuant to FRE 104(a) would
be inconsistent with the legislative history surrounding FRE 404(b).66
The Court cited the House Report which stated that the rule was
intended to “plac[e] greater emphasis on admissibility than did the
final Court version”67 and the Senate Report, which stated that “[t]he
use of the word ‘may’ with respect to the admissibility of evidence of
crimes, wrongs, or other acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary
discretion on the trial judge.”68 The Court concluded that “Congress
was not nearly so concerned with the potential prejudicial effect of
Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that restrictions would
not be placed on the admission of such evidence.”69 Tellingly, the
Court acknowledged that admitting the evidence pursuant to FRE
104(b) was prioritizing the admission of evidence with less restriction
over its “potential prejudicial effect.”70 The two goals are not
necessarily mutually exclusive,71 but prior bad acts evidence has
consistently been recognized as having a substantial prejudicial risk.72
After citing legislative intent, the Court proceeded to explicitly
acknowledge a fear that “unduly prejudicial evidence might be
introduced under Rule 404(b),”73 anticipating a criticism of its
decision.74 The Court, however, rejected that a higher standard of
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1988).
See id. at 690.
See id.
See id. at 688.
Id. at 688 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973)).
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277 at 24 (1974)).
Id. at 688–89.
Id. at 688.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691.
See, e.g., People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 (Colo. 1991).
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evidence through a preliminary finding of fact pursuant to FRE
104(a) was necessary to reduce this risk of prejudice. Instead, the
Court identified four sources of insulation from prejudice:
[F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy
requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); third,
from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to
determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice . . . ;
and fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that
the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar
acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for
which it was admitted.75

Requiring trial courts only to screen prior bad acts evidence under
a minimal standard of proof instead of having them perform a
preliminary fact-finding subsequently rippled throughout the states
and created a stark contrast with states that continued to apply a
higher standard of evidence,76 as supported initially by the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Huddleston.77
Aside from this preliminary fact-finding, jurisdictions rejecting and
those adopting Huddleston employ functionally similar approaches to
prior bad acts admissibility.78 Courts inquire as to whether the
evidence is being offered for a purpose other than proving a
propensity for criminality.79 Courts then evaluate whether the
evidence is relevant.80 Federal courts and jurisdictions that have
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence perform this inquiry pursuant
to FRE 402.81 Finally, courts determine whether the prejudicial risk

75. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691–92. The first protection refers to the requirement
that the evidence not be offered to prove a propensity for criminality, a concern that
initially gave rise to the prohibition against prior bad act evidence. For a discussion
of the policy rationales underlying the prohibition against prior bad act evidence, see
discussion infra Part I.C.2.
76. See discussion infra, Part I.D.
77. 802 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986).
78. Compare Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691–92, with State v. Hernandez, 784 A.2d
1225, 1222 (N.J. 2001) (holding that courts must examine whether the prior bad acts
evidence is being offered for a proper purpose and if its probative value outweighs its
“apparent prejudice”).
79. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691; Hernandez, 784 A.2d at 1222.
80. See, e.g., Hernandez, 784 A.2d at 1222.
81. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687–88.
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of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, in which
case the evidence would be excluded.82
C.

1.

Situating the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence Among
the Rules of Evidence: A Story of Prejudice

Limiting Prejudice Is at the Root of Many Rules of Evidence and
Is Effectuated Through Witness Preparation

FRE 102 states that the goals of the rules of evidence are to aid in
ascertaining truth and “securing a just determination.”83 The Rules
proscribe a number of forms of evidence as inadmissible, including
testimony that is “legally irrelevant information, speculation, opinion
and hearsay.”84 For obvious reasons, a limiting instruction to the jury
that they should disregard testimony they have already heard can
only mitigate so much of the prejudice inherent in hearing a witness
offer hearsay statements that address a material fact in dispute or
speculation as to the ultimate issue of a case.85 To limit such
prejudicial and inadmissible testimony, attorneys must engage in
witness preparation.86 To avoid prejudicing the opposing party,
attorneys are expected not to elicit inadmissible testimony from their
witnesses, whether intentionally or not, and deliberately doing so is
expressly unethical.87 Avoiding prejudice is the policy rationale for
numerous rules of evidence, which in turn is addressed as a
preliminary matter by witness preparation.
The underlying
assumption is that more prejudice is avoided by excluding the
evidence through rule and preparation than is inadvertently created
by the ensuing witness preparation.

82.
83.
84.
85.

See, e.g., id. at 688; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
Green, supra note 13, at 706 (footnotes omitted).
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”: Should

the Judge or the Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused Committed an
Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404?, 42 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 813, 822–23 (1998). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135
(1968) (“Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be
considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances
occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually
inadvertently. . . . It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury
can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to disregard such information.”).
86. See discussion infra Part II.
87. See Green, supra note 13.
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The Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence: Limiting Prejudice

A similar desire to minimize undue prejudice underlies the
prohibition against prior bad acts evidence.88
Unsurprisingly,
differing evidentiary philosophies regarding the prejudice caused by
prior bad acts evidence is a primary reason that some courts have
followed Huddleston and others have rejected it.89 Therefore, to
distinguish the respective courts’ decisions, it is important to elucidate
the theories of prejudice undergirding the prohibition of prior bad
acts evidence generally.
In 1894, the bar against prior bad act evidence was formulated
specifically in terms of protecting the defendant from evidence that
established nothing more than a propensity to commit crime and that
did not address facts in issue. In Makin v. Attorney-General for New
South Wales, Lord Herschell held,
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce
evidence tending to shew [sic] that the accused has been guilty of
criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the
purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the
offence for which he is being tried.90

American courts had asserted the bar against prior bad acts evidence
well before Lord Herschell in Makin,91 but the policy reasoning
enunciated in Makin succinctly describes the pervasive and highly
influential fear of such evidence’s prejudicial impact.92 The policy
concerns of admitting uncharged prior bad acts have since been
further elucidated into three general concerns.
First, there is a fear of what has been termed “the danger of
overvaluation.”93 Justice Jackson described this concern in Michelson
v. United States:

88. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1:3.
89. See generally Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2003) (quoting Makin v. Attorney-Gen. for N.S.W., [1894] A.C. 57
(P.C.)).
90. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of Chances: Relying
on the Concept of Relative Frequency to Admit Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 7
CRIM. JUST. 16, 16 (1992).
91. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).
92. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1.2.
93. Thomas J. Leach, “Propensity” Evidence and FRE 404: A Proposed
Amended Rule with an Accompanying “Plain English” Jury Instruction, 68 TENN. L.
REV. 825, 828 (2001).
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The inquiry [into character] is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge.94

Specifically, it is the fear that character or uncharged prior bad act
evidence would be so effective that the jury would have difficulty
discerning between the evidentiary burden for the charged conduct
and the defendant’s guilt for collateral uncharged misconduct.
Second, there is a fear of what has been termed “the danger of
unwarranted punishment.”95
This has also been termed the
“nullification prejudice,”96 and refers to the concern that a jury may
conclude that the defendant deserves punishment for his character or
for his prior uncharged bad acts, and would convict him on that basis,
irrespective of the evidence pertaining to the charged conduct.97
Third, there is a fear that the evidence will confuse the issues for
the jury.
Courts fear that the evidence may lead to the
“overcomplication of issues” and that “particularly if there is a
dispute about whether the defendant committed the other acts,
introduction of evidence concerning those acts could be timeconsuming and distract the factfinder from the central issues in the
case.”98
In sum, these three policy concerns are different manifestations of
potential prejudice to the defendant. There is a base of research
indicating that evidence of criminal propensity may be impactful in
practice. Perhaps the most famous study of juror deliberations, the
Chicago Jury Project, found that “the presumption of innocence
operates only for defendants without prior criminal records.”99
Furthermore,

94. 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
95. See Leach, supra note 93.
96. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1184.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“Proof of character is excluded not because it has no probative value, but because it
sometimes may lead a jury to convict the accused on the ground of bad character
deserving punishment irrespective of guilt. In addition, defendants should not be
placed in a position of defending against crimes for which they are not charged.”).
98. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1185–86 (citing Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity
to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 777
(1981)).
99. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1.2 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966)).
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[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct strips the defendant of the
presumption of innocence. If the judge admits a defendant’s
uncharged misconduct and the jury thereby learns of the record, the
jury will probably use a “different . . . calculus of probabilities” in
deciding whether to convict. The uncharged misconduct stigmatizes
the defendant and predisposes the jury to find him liable or guilty.100

Other studies, however, have suggested that prior bad act evidence
is not so damning. In a meta-analysis of mock jury studies, Larry
Lauden and Ronald Allen found that the results were “all over the
map.”101 Some reported studies found that evidence of prior
convictions increased conviction rates by upwards of fifty percent,
while others found that “inadmissible priors evidence was utilized by
mock jurors only when it was favorable to defendants,” and that after
deliberation, there was no difference in conviction rates based upon
exposure to prior bad act evidence.102
Studies of real trials, instead, consistently found that defendants
with prior convictions were more likely to be convicted at trial.103
These results persisted, however, even when jurors were not told
about the defendant’s prior bad acts.104
Despite the mixed empirical findings, legal scholars and jurists
have rearticulated the three aforementioned policy reasons while
selectively highlighting studies to assert that there is a prevailing
prejudice inherent to prior bad acts evidence.105
Nonetheless, requiring a preliminary finding of fact by a judge at a
level at least as high as a preponderance of the evidence for the

100. Id. § 1.2 nn.11–13 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966);
Thomas J. Pickett, Admissibility of Evidence as to Separate and Distinct Crimes, 18
NEB. L. BULL. 336 (1939); and People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986)
(“the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against an accused”)).
101. Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes
Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 493, 500 (2011).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 503.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 420 N.W. 499, 508–10 (Mich. 1988); Victor J. Gold,
Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
59, 68, 80 (1984) (colorfully comparing criminals to leopards in the minds of jurors in
that neither are expected to change their spots); Edward Imwinkelried, The Use of

Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines
that Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 MIL. L. REV. 41, 47–
48 (1990); Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior
Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 224–25 nn.32–35
(1998).
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admissibility of prior bad acts evidence ultimately creates a need for
witness preparation similar to that created by other rules of
evidence.106 While, for example, hearsay, speculation, and opinion
rules of evidence require witness preparation to purge those lines
from prospective witness testimony, a preliminary showing of fact
requires witnesses to recall and offer prior bad act testimony with
such detail and specificity that it satisfies the pertinent standard of
evidence.107
D. Courts Divided Along Fears of Undue Prejudice: Huddleston
Leniency Versus Higher Standards
The division between courts about what standard to apply to the
admission of prior bad acts evidence largely corresponds to how
concerned courts are about its prejudicial value and whether they
view a higher standard of evidence of the act’s commission as an
effective prophylactic.108
Federal courts, naturally, follow Huddleston, but states are divided
on which model to follow. A number of states have chosen to follow
Huddleston,
including
Alaska,109
Alabama,110
California,111
112
113
114
115
Georgia,
Idaho,
Kentucky,
Indiana,116
Connecticut,
117
118
119
120
Louisiana,
Maine,
Massachusetts,
Michigan,
Mississippi,121

106. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
107. See discussion infra Part II.E for further treatment of the incentives for
greater witness preparation through a need for detailed testimony created by higher
standards of evidence for prior bad act admissibility.
108. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 831–36.
109. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Apr. 23, 2003).
110. See Ex parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562, 567 (Ala. 1989).
111. See People v. Virgil, 253 P.3d 553, 593 (Cal. 2011).
112. See State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1151 (Conn. 2005) (“We find the United
States Supreme Court’s reasoning persuasive. Much like the Federal Rules of
Evidence, under our Code of Evidence, the protection against unfair prejudice
emanates not from a requirement of a preliminary finding of fact by the trial court,
but from four other sources.”); see also State v. Holly, 941 A.2d 372, 377 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2008) (holding that the jury must reasonably be able “to find that the defendant
in fact had committed the uncharged act”).
113. See Freeman v. State, 486 S.E.2d 348, 351 (Ga. 1997).
114. See State v. Kay, 927 P.2d 897, 905 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e find the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Huddleston to be persuasive.”).
115. See Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997).
116. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220–21 (Ind. 1997).
117. See State v. Barnes, 2011-1421, pp.15–16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/19/12); 100 So. 3d
926, 936 (“The burden of proof in a pretrial hearing held in accordance with State v.
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North Carolina,122 South Dakota,123 Vermont,124 Virginia,125
Wisconsin,126 and Wyoming.127 Often the rationale is agreement with
the Supreme Court’s reasoning or a desire for uniformity with the
Federal Rules of Evidence.128
States that maintain preliminary fact-finding by a judge for prior
bad acts evidence generally do so for one of two reasons: they follow
pre-Huddleston precedent and have not expressly chosen whether to
follow Huddleston; or, they have expressly rejected Huddleston,
either by statute or decision.129 Texas requires that the prior bad acts
be provable beyond a reasonable doubt.130 A number of states
require a preliminary showing that the defendant committed the
uncharged conduct by clear and convincing evidence, including

Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), shall be identical to the burden of proof required by
Federal Rules of Evidence Article IV, Rule 404.” (citing LA. CODE EVID. ANN. Art.
1104)).
118. See State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 933 n.5 (Me. 1991) (holding that even though
the defendant had been acquitted of a prior crime, previously charged conduct could
still be submitted to the jury as a prior bad act in part because the standard for prior
bad acts admissibility is only that a reasonable jury be able to find that the act was
committed by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence).
119. See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 732 N.E. 278, 280–81 (Mass. 2000).
120. See People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 126 (Mich. 1993), amended by
520 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. 1994).
121. See Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 779 (Miss. 1997) (“[S]ufficient evidence
must be shown, not necessarily by a preponderance of the evidence, for the jury to
determine that the defendant actually committed the prior acts.”), overruled on other
grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999).
122. See State v. Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (N.C. 1991) (“[W]e find the reasoning
of Huddleston compelling.”).
123. See State v. Barber, 552 N.W.2d 817, 822 (S.D. 1996) (“This Court has
previously rejected the notion that bad acts testimony must meet any standards of
credibility before it may be admitted into evidence.”).
124. See State v. Robinson, 611 A.2d 852, 854 (Vt. 1992), abrogated on other
grounds as stated in State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258 (Vt. 1996).
125. See Pavlick v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 920, 924–25 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
126. See State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918, 930 (Wis. 1999).
127. See Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1996).
128. See, e.g., State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1151 (Conn. 2005); State v.
Schindler, 429 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), holding mod. by State v. Lee,
499 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
129. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Apr. 23, 2003); supra notes 133–55.
130. See Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“[T]rial
court must, under rule 104(b), make an initial determination . . . that jury could
reasonably find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed extraneous
offense.”).
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Arizona,131 Delaware,132 the District of Columbia,133 Florida,134 Iowa,135
Maryland,136 Nevada,137 New Hampshire,138 New Jersey,139 New
York,140 North Dakota,141 Oklahoma,142 South Carolina,143 and
Tennessee.144
Minnesota and Nebraska both implemented a clear and convincing
standard through statute.145 A few states require that the prior bad
acts be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, including
Colorado,146 Illinois,147 West Virginia,148 and Washington.149
Because this Note is focused on the admission of prior bad acts
evidence that a witness cannot fully recall, it is focused on how

131. See State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997).
132. See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (“The other crimes must be
proved by evidence which is ‘plain, clear and conclusive.’” (quoting Renzi v. State,
320 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. 1974))).
133. See Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 n.18, 1101 (D.C. 1996).
134. See Phillips v. State, 591 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
135. See State v. Howell, 557 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (requiring
“clear proof”).
136. See Harris v. State, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (Md. 1991).
137. See Winiarz v. State, 820 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Nev. 1991) (“Before evidence of
prior bad acts may be admitted, there must be clear and convincing evidence that
such acts actually occurred.”).
138. See State v. Michaud, 610 A.2d 354, 356 (N.H. 1992) (requiring “clear proof
that the defendant committed the prior offense”).
139. See State v. Hernandez, 734 A.2d 1225, 1235 (N.J. 2001).
140. See People v. Robinson, 503 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1986) (“other crime
evidence” must be “established by clear and convincing evidence” when it is used to
prove the Molineux exception of identity through a defendant’s distinctive modus
operandi).
141. See State v. Schmeets, 2009 ND 163, ¶15, 772 N.W.2d 623, 629.
142. See Welch v. State, 2000 OK Crim. App. 8, ¶8, 2 P.3d 356, 365.
143. See State v. Smith, 387 S.E.2d 245, 247 (S.C. 1989).
144. See State v. McCary, 922 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tenn. 1996).
145. See State v. Wilson, 556 N.W.2d 643, 652–53 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); Ture v.
State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1984).
146. See People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 n.4 (Colo. 1991) (“Given the clearly
recognized potential for prejudice inherent in other-crime evidence, it seems more
reasonable to us . . . to require the trial court to be satisfied by a preponderance of
the evidence of the conditionally relevant facts . . . and not merely to determine
whether the jury ‘could reasonably find’ the conditionally relevant facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
690 (1988))).
147. See People v. Oaks, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (Ill. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds in In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 2000) (requiring “more than a mere
suspicion”).
148. See State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 526–28 (W. Va. 1994).
149. See State v. Hartzell, 237 P.3d 928, 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
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different standards of proof affect the admission of evidence based, in
part, on the credibility of the witness and evidence. It is therefore
important to note that some jurisdictions that have rejected
Huddleston, such as Texas and South Carolina, nonetheless exclude
the credibility of prior bad acts testimony from the trial judge’s
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence, just as in Huddleston.150
Meanwhile, others, such as Nebraska and West Virginia, reserve
credibility for the trial judge under the higher standard of proof.151
For example, while New Jersey and Delaware both require that a trial
court find that the prior bad acts evidence be shown by clear and
convincing evidence,152 a New Jersey court may consider the
credibility of the witness alleging the prior bad acts evidence in
making that preliminary determination, but a Delaware court may
not.153
Courts that have rejected Huddleston often cite concerns for
prejudicing the defendant by admitting prior bad acts evidence. In an
en banc decision, the Arizona Supreme Court supported its rejection
of Huddleston’s use of 104(b) in lieu of a preliminary finding of clear
and convincing evidence of commission by reasoning that
[prior bad acts] evidence is quite capable of having an impact
beyond its relevance to the crime charged and may influence the
jury’s decision on issues other than those on which it was received,
despite cautionary instructions from the judge. . . . Because of the
high probability of prejudice from the admission of prior bad acts,
the court must ensure that the evidence against the defendant
150. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690; State v. Wilson, 545 S.E.2d 827, 830 (S.C.
2001) (holding that credibility of prior bad acts testimony “was an issue for the jury’s
consideration”); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App. 1996) (“The
conditional fact at issue in this case was whether Gunnlaugsson made the racially
defamatory statement attributed to him by Taylor. . . . To the extent that the court
made its own determination of Taylor’s credibility rather than leaving that
determination to the jury, it exceeded the scope of its discretion under rule 104(b).”).
151. See State v. Floyd, 763 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Neb. 2009) (affirming trial court’s
admission of prior bad acts evidence where trial court considered witness’s
credibility); McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527 n.16 (holding that the trial court should
weigh the credibility of prior bad acts evidence) (quoting Daniels v. United States,
613 A.2d 342, 347 (D.C. App. 1992)).
152. See supra notes 132, 139 and accompanying text.
153. Compare State v. Dennis, Nos. A-1055-07, A-3147-07, 2011 WL 709721, at *11
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2011) (affirming the admission of prior bad acts
testimony where the trial court determined that the witness who offered it was
sufficiently credible to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard), with
Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 427–28 (Del. 2011) (“[S]worn testimony [of prior bad
acts] constitutes clear and convincing evidence for purposes of admissibility, with
credibility to be decided by the trier of fact.”).
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directly establishes “that the defendant took part in the collateral
act, and to shield the accused from prejudicial evidence based upon
‘highly circumstantial inferences.’” . . . To allow a lesser standard in
a criminal case is to open too large a possibility of prejudice.154

Ultimately, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was based upon
a fear of prejudice to the defendant, and the higher standard was
treated as a way to insulate against prejudice. Similarly, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the clear and convincing
standard “is a necessary component of the fortification against the
possibility of unfair prejudice when a court determines whether
relevant other-crime evidence should be admitted in the trial of an
accused.”155
Colorado and West Virginia both adopted a preponderance of the
evidence standard for the admission of prior bad acts evidence, but
rejected Huddleston in doing so.156 In an en banc decision, the
Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that using FRE 104(b) was likely
to create undue prejudice for the defendant.157 The court held that
the problem with such a standard was that “regardless of the jury’s
ultimate determination of the conditional fact, the jury might well
convict the defendant not on the basis of the strength of the
prosecution’s case but because the defendant is a person of bad
character.”158 In other words, if the jury were given the evidence, it
might be prejudiced even if it did not find the conditional fact that the
defendant was responsible for the prior bad acts. West Virginia’s
Supreme Court echoed these concerns, holding that
[t]o expose the jury to Rule 404(b) evidence before the trial court
has determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts
were committed and that the defendant committed them would in
our view subject the defendant to an unfair risk of conviction
regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination of these facts.159

“These facts” refer to the conditional facts that the defendant was the
perpetrator of the prior bad acts offered into evidence. These courts,

154. State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (emphasis added)
(quoting Vivian M. Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts

Under the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B): The Weighing of
Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 457 (1993)).
155. State v. Hernandez, 784 A.2d 1225, 1235 (N.J. 2001).
156. People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 n.4 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); McGinnis, 455
S.E.2d at 526–27.
157. Garner, 806 P.2d at 372.
158. Id.
159. State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994) (emphasis added).
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in rejecting Huddleston, do not explain how a juror may actually be
influenced by prior bad acts that the juror does not believe a
defendant committed due to a lack of proof of commission. Their
criticisms of Huddleston have been challenged as relying on
incomplete and flawed reasoning and for being conclusory.160
In addition to the arguments offered by courts that have rejected
Huddleston,161 there are other circumstances in which a Huddleston
standard may result in greater prejudice against the defendant.162 A
defendant may be especially prejudiced by prior bad acts evidence
under Huddleston’s minimal standard of proof when the prior bad
acts are being offered with little proof but through a chorus of
multiple witnesses.163 Even though a jury may be instructed that it
should not consider prior bad acts evidence unless the prior bad acts
have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence,164 jurors
“would naturally be inclined to ascribe significance to the fact of
multiple accusations even if they find the foundational testimony
inadequate to prove up the accusations.”165 The defendant would be
unable to disprove accusations that were untrue and could not be
proven, but were nonetheless credible in the eyes of the jury purely
due to quantity.
E.

Higher Standards of Proof of Commission Require Greater
Amounts of Detail by Witnesses

Under Huddleston, the bar for the admissibility of prior bad acts
evidence is low with regards to proof of commission; the evidence is
evaluated by the jury pursuant to FRE 104(b), and the trial judge
intervenes only to screen the prior bad acts if, given all of the
available evidence, proof of commission does not clear a “minimal
standard of proof.”166 As a result, in jurisdictions that have adopted
Huddleston, even vague or unparticularized prior bad acts may be
offered as testimony and may be admissible if they are offered for a
non-propensity reason and if their prejudicial value does not

160. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 832–36.
161. See, e.g., State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997); Garner, 806 P.2d
at 372; McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527.
162. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 85.
163. See id. at 843–44.
164. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 9:64.
165. Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 844.
166. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). For a discussion of
prior bad act admissibility under 104(b) see supra Part I.B.1.
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substantially outweigh their probative value.167 The trial court does
not even consider the credibility of the witnesses offering the
evidence.168 A witness, therefore, can testify to the incompleteness of
his or her memory as to prior bad acts without suffering any
evidentiary consequence. A lack of detail is not fatal, and can be
explored on cross-examination by the defendant.
For courts that do not follow Huddleston and apply a higher
standard of proof, however, prior bad acts evidence is scrutinized
more closely, and the details or specificity a witness provides can bear
on whether the testimony is deemed admissible.169 For example, the
clarity and certainty of a witness’s testimony may have a bearing on
its admissibility.170 Vague, circumstantial evidence of prior bad acts
has been found to be insufficient under a jurisdiction’s clear and
convincing standard of proof.171 Uncorroborated testimony of prior
crimes can be insufficient, and render the allegations inadmissible,
where “there are no details about the circumstances” of the prior bad
acts.172
167. See, e.g., State v. Burdick, No. 2008-158, 2009 WL 428058, at *4 (Vt. Feb. 4,
2009) (holding that the victim could testify to vague, unparticularized prior bad acts
by the defendant under Huddleston “without a preliminary finding by the trial court
that the act actually occurred” and that credibility was reserved for the jury to
decide); Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo. 1999) (another jurisdiction which
adopted Huddleston held that the allegations made by former foster children with
failing memories of sexual misconduct did not need to be proven by the prosecutor
under FRE 404(b) to be admissible).
168. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“[T]he trial court neither weighs credibility nor
makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
169. See supra notes 133–56 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., State v. Oates, 611 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming
the admission of uncorroborated prior bad acts testimony where the witness
“provided clear and unequivocal testimony”).
171. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 189 P.3d 366, 371–72 (Ariz. 2008) (“The trial court
concluded that there was ‘circumstantial evidence that something sexual happened’
and that there was a possible ‘inference to be drawn’ of ‘untoward’ activity. The
appropriate question . . . however, is whether there was clear and convincing
evidence.”). Compare State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 933 n.5 (Me. 1991) (a jurisdiction
that has adopted Huddleston allowing prior bad acts evidence even where the
defendant had been acquitted of the conduct), with Kimberly v. State, 757 P.2d 1326,
1328 (Nev. 1988) (a jurisdiction requiring clear and convincing evidence rejecting
prior bad acts evidence after considering that there were circumstances that detracted
from its reliability and that the grand jury had declined to indict the defendant for
those acts). But see State v. D.K., No. A-3688-06T2, 2008 WL 3539935, at *5 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2008) (holding that a victim of child molestation’s
testimony as to uncharged incidents of sexual assault, while “somewhat vague and
uncorroborated,” was sufficient under a clear and convincing evidence standard).
172. State v. Timmerman, 480 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Neb. 1992).
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Another illustrative example of the role of detail in establishing
credibility is in the context of probable cause for a search warrant
based on information provided by an informant. When determining
if probable cause exists, courts evaluate the details an informant
offers in determining the informant’s credibility.173 The detail a
witness can provide thereby correlates to the witness’s credibility.
Although under Huddleston the required showing of proof of
commission is “minimal” and courts are not to consider the credibility
of the witnesses,174 courts are more demanding in jurisdictions that
require higher standards of proof.
II. THE RISK OF FALSE MEMORIES AND MISINFORMATION
In order to elicit detailed witness testimony, attorneys interview
their witnesses to determine the boundaries of their witnesses’
recollections and prepare their witnesses to testify effectively. The
more detail that an attorney seeks to elicit, the more questions the
attorney is likely to ask the witness. This Part begins by discussing
the role of witness interviewing and preparation in the trial process.
The ethics of witness interviewing and preparation are discussed,
distinguishing between prosecutors and other attorneys. Part II.B
then explores how various types of questions attorneys ask
prospective witnesses during interviews and preparation can alter
witnesses’ memories of events and introduce prejudicial false
testimony.
A. Witness Preparation: Foundation of Trial Preparation and
Potential Source of Falsehood

1.

Witness Preparation Is Fundamental to Litigation

Witness preparation is a standard, ubiquitous, and foundational
aspect of litigation.175 Courts themselves have recognized its role: the
North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not improper
for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to explain the

173. See e.g., People v. DiFalco, 610 N.E.2d 352, 355 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Hicks,
378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (App. Div. 1975); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶8, 142 P.3d
1155, 1160.
174. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
175. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278–79 (1989)
(“American litigators regularly use witness preparation, and virtually all would, upon
reflection, consider it a fundamental duty of representation and a basic element of
effective advocacy.”).
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applicable law in any given situation and to go over before trial the
attorney’s questions and the witness’ answers so that the witness will
be ready for his appearance in court, will be more at ease because he
knows what to expect, and will give his testimony in the most effective
manner that he can.”176 The West Virginia Supreme Court has even
held that “an attorney has an ethical duty to prepare a witness” for
testimony.177
Witness preparation can serve many purposes such as: gathering
facts both about an incident and the witness’s recollection; rehearsing
the witness’s testimony; refreshing the witness’s memory as to prior
statements;178 and even discussing the testimony of other witnesses
and offering the witness an opportunity to reconsider his testimony
given that information.179 The benefits to giving witnesses the content
of another witness’s statements is to give the witness the chance to
reevaluate their own level of certainty and to prevent them from
becoming flustered at trial by contrary statements or documents
presented by other witnesses.180
In addition, attorneys are expected to prepare witnesses to testify
at trial so as to avoid any violations of the rules of evidence by
eliminating potentially prejudicial and impermissible statements, such
as hearsay, speculation, or opinion testimony.181

176. Liisa Renée Salmi, Don’t Walk the Line: Ethical Considerations in Preparing
Witnesses for Deposition and Trial, 18 REV. LITIG. 135, 140–41 (1999) (quoting State
v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979)).
177. State ex rel. Means v. King, 520 S.E.2d 875, 882 (W. Va. 1999).
178. Prosecutors, however, are actively disincentivized from recording any witness
statements because any statements they record must be turned over to the defense.
See Gershman, supra note 2, at 851–53; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (2012) (requiring
the disclosure of witness statements that (1) were signed or adopted by the witness,
(2) contain a substantially verbatim recital of any oral statement made by the witness
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such statement, or (3) contain
any statement made by the witness to a grand jury); People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d
881 (N.Y. 1961), codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2013)
(requiring disclosure of any recorded statement by a witness which pertains to the
subject matter of the witness’s testimony).
179. See Richard Alcorn, “Aren’t You Really Telling Me . . . ?”: Ethics and
Preparing Witness Testimony, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2008, at 17–18. See generally
Applegate, supra note 175.
180. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 304–05.
181. See Gershman, supra note 2 at 857; Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness
Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995); see also discussion supra Part I.C.1.
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The Ethics of Witness Preparation

Attorneys are expected to uphold certain basic ethical behaviors
when interviewing, preparing and questioning witnesses. Nearly all of
the states have adopted some form of the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) or other
similar rules of conduct.182 Most of the states that have not done so
had adopted rules of conduct before the promulgation of the Model
Rules, and these states recognize standards of conduct for witness
preparation and testimony that are largely similar to the Model
Rules.183 The Model Rules prohibit attorneys from offering “evidence
the lawyer knows to be false.”184 Further, a lawyer shall not “assist a
witness to testify falsely,”185 “counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,”186
or “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”187
Professor Charles Wolfram has argued that advising “a witness
about the law or about desired testimony before seeking the
witness’[s] own version of events comes dangerously near subornation
of perjury.”188 By that measure, telling a witness what testimony
would be useful and then asking the witness about what they recall
with seeming interest more in such testimony over the truth only
pushes up against the farthest bounds of ethical conduct. Even
though “historically the cases demonstrate that only the most
egregious professional conduct violations have been disciplined, dicta

182. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 138.
183. Id. at n.12.
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011) (“(a) A lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer
. . . (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.”)
185. Id. R. 3.4 (“A lawyer shall not: . . . (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a
witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law
. . . .”).
186. Id. R. 1.29(d).
187. Id. R. 8.4(c).
188. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Teaching Ethics in Evidence, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 961, 967 n.10 (2003) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.3 (1986)).
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from some opinions suggest that the standard to which attorneys may
be held is actually much higher.”189
Nonetheless, for the hypothetical prosecutor from the introduction,
in a jurisdiction that has rejected Huddleston, there is an incentive to
keep asking questions of the complainant to elicit extra details until
the complainant’s memory is exhausted,190 and continued questioning
is squarely within the ethical responsibilities of a prosecutor, and may
even be paradigmatic zealous advocacy.191 Given the responsibilities
of prosecutors as truth-seekers, in trials where the consequences are
the forfeiture of a defendant’s freedom, it is of paramount importance
to appreciate whether and how such questions, while ethical, may
nevertheless be prejudicial to the administration of justice through
unintentionally distorting the memories of witnesses.
B.

Risks of Witness Preparation in Creating False Testimony

1.

Analysis from Legal Scholarship: The Risks of Even Careful
Witness Preparation

Despite the significant role of witness preparation in litigation, it
presents many opportunities for the introduction of falsehood into
the record.192 Attorneys and legal scholars have promulgated a
number of analyses on the ways in which an attorney could
deliberately or unintentionally, and with the best of intentions, play a
role in a witness forming false memories or memory distortions.
These analyses integrate research from social psychology, personal
experiences, and “intuitive and impressionistic” conclusions.193
The deliberate and thereby unethical methods through which
attorneys can elicit false or manipulated testimony from witnesses are
well-documented.194 An attorney might tell a witness that particular
testimony would be necessary or helpful despite knowing that it
would be false. The attorney might then ask that witness about what
189. Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note, Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of “Coaching”, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 389, 395 (1987).
190. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
191. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 286–87.
192. See generally Applegate, supra note 175, Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi,
supra note 176.
193. Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1092 n.18 (1975); see also Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi, supra
note 175.
194. See, e.g., Wydick, supra note 181.
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the witness knew, expecting the witness’s answer to be in conformity
with what the attorney wanted to hear.195 Knowingly eliciting such
false testimony is both unlawful and unethical.196 Of course, an
attorney could more subtly achieve the same ends, without risking the
same ethical and legal sanction. An oft-cited example is “the Lecture
scene” in the film and book Anatomy of a Murder.197 In this scene, an
attorney is defending a client accused of murdering his wife’s lover.
When the defendant offers an undesirable fact, his attorney stops the
interview and provides a detailed lecture on the laws of homicide and
its possible defenses, until the defendant understands that he can only
prevail with an insanity defense.198 At that point, the client describes
his state of mind at the time of the murder so as to support an insanity
defense.199
Returning to the case of the prosecutor and complainant from the
opening passage of this Note, there are a number of ways in which the
prosecutor might elicit false testimony from the complainant while
believing he is helping ensure justice and secure her an order of
protection. After the complainant made it clear that she could not
remember details about any prior incidents with her ex-boyfriend, the
prosecutor could have stopped the complainant and begun his own
“Lecture scene.” He could have explained that their jurisdiction
required a certain minimum amount of proof for the admissibility of
prior bad acts, and then he could have provided the types of details
for hypothetical bad acts which he was confident would satisfy any
clear and convincing standard of admissibility. Indeed, having a
witness testify to details about an event he or she cannot remember is
no more ethical than having a witness change his or her recollection
of one that did. Such a prosecutor is not the intended focus of this
Note, however. An attorney, civil or criminal, that is willing to elicit
false testimony or suborn perjury to increase the likelihood of the
admission of prior bad acts, or any other evidence, is best targeted
criminally and through ethical sanction, and not through a
reconsideration of rules of evidence.200

195. See id. at 19. Richard Wydick has called “knowingly and overtly inducing” a
witness to testify falsely “Grade One witness coaching.” Id.
196. Id. at 18.
197. See id. at 25.
198. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 32 (1958); see also Applegate,
supra note 175, at 302; Wydick, supra note 181, at 25–26.
199. See TRAVER, supra note 198, at 46–49.
200. See generally Wydick, supra note 181, at 52.
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More troubling are the ways in which an attorney can
unintentionally and unknowingly change a witness’s testimony or
recollection through witness preparation, thereby creating prejudice.
At the highest level, findings by psychologists suggest that the very
act of interviewing can produce “distorted and inaccurate
testimony.”201
Another less sweeping concern is the unconscious impact an
attorney can have on a witness through the dynamics of respect,
power, and an innocuous desire to please. Because “[p]arties can
hardly be expected to interview the potential witnesses in relatively
detached ways . . . the future witness is likely to try to adapt himself to
expectations mirrored” in the attorney.202 As a result, “gaps in [a
witness’s] memory may even unconsciously be filled out by what he
thinks accords with the lawyer’s expectations and are in tune with his
thesis. Later, in court, these additions to memory images may appear
to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his original
perceptions.”203 This mirroring can occur absent any partisan
signaling from the attorney.204 In a review of witness preparation’s
common and best practices, John Applegate summarized his findings
that “[e]ven without partisan motivations, people commonly try to
please their audience. Thus, the witness will try to please the lawyer
during witness preparation, who in turn will further encourage and
reinforce the helpful tendencies in the witness’s story.”205
The prejudicial threat of such a dynamic is immediately apparent,
and is particularly alarming for prosecutors. While civil attorneys are
expected ethically and professionally to prepare their witnesses in
developing testimony, including down to the point of word selection
(in the interests of clarity and not substantive change),206 prosecutors
are first and foremost seekers of justice and truth.207 Yet by simply
having read a case file and formed an opinion about the case or about
the culpability of the defendant, the prosecutor may impact a witness
with his “one-sided attitude.”208 For our hypothetical prosecutor and

201. J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 487,
537 (2002).
202. Damaska, supra note 193, at 1094.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Applegate, supra note 175, at 332.
206. See Tanford, supra note 201, at 540–41.
207. See Gershman, supra note 2, at 851.
208. Damaska, supra note 193, at 1094.
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complainant, the implications of this possibility are real and
immediate. By believing his complainant and believing in the guilt
and menacing history of the defendant, perhaps in part by having
seen the defendant’s criminal history, the prosecutor’s earnest
attempts to probe the boundaries of the complainant’s memory may
convey his confidence in the defendant’s guilt. This could result in
the complainant “unconsciously” filling out “gaps” in her memory,
creating details where there were none.209 Prejudice against the
defendant is created when the complainant testifies and she becomes
certain that “these additions to memory” are her own recollection.210
When a witness develops confidence in such false memories, it has
been called “memory hardening,” and is a well-recognized dynamic.211
Leading questions asked during witness preparation may also
result in inaccurate testimony and prejudice. In an attorney-client,
and especially a prosecutor-witness relationship, where the entire
authority of the government hangs overhead, the attorney is unlikely
to be challenged by the witness in how he frames questions. As a
result, any leading questions he asks can be exceptionally impactful.
The threat presented by leading questions is most pronounced and
well-recognized for child witnesses.212 Even though adults have a
“greater capacity to fight off such questions,”213 they are still
susceptible to having their recollections affected by such questions,214
and “their hostility to them can itself lead to [memory] distortion.”215
Furthermore, questions do not have to be expressly leading to have
an impact on a witness’s memory. A question’s “form and context”
can bias memories and can be functionally leading all the same: “The
very syntax of our language carries suggestion as to how events
happen, including implications as to how one thing causes another.”216
Influencing witnesses through language can even “be brought about

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1987); Wydick, supra note
181, at 10–11.
212. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990) (affirming the reversal of a
conviction for sexual crimes and holding that the victim’s allegations of abuse were
based on suggestive and leading questioning by an interrogator).
213. Paul C. Wohlmuth, Jurisprudence and Memory Research, 8 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 249, 255 (1997).
214. See generally Elizabeth Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness
Report, 7 J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 550 (1975).
215. Wohlmuth, supra note 213, at 255.
216. Id.
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without conscious design. . . . Thus, suggestibility and other distortion
is an interactive phenomenon staged by the routine configuring of the
question and answer process.”217
Finally, offering witnesses access to the testimony of other
witnesses or other evidence is a recognized practice in witness
preparation.218 As a general practice, the legal benefits of providing
witnesses with this information during preparation have been
discussed previously.219 Nonetheless, there is a risk of creating false
memories because “[w]hen memories are vague, people fill in the
gaps with what they believe to be true or what they infer to be true.
In short, the process of piecing together the past can often be highly
prone to distortion.”220

2.

Psychological Research on Memory and Witnesses: Reason for
Concern About False Testimony and More Questions

While much of the scholarly literature on the prejudicial risks of
witness preparation draws on social psychology research,221 that
research is based on experiments, often run on college students, that
attempt to recreate the experience of being a witness to an incident.222
In a series of foundational studies, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus
elucidated many of the risk factors for false memories and
confabulation.223
One important finding is that the simple phrasing of a question
asked of a witness can ultimately impact the witness’s perceptions of
an incident and thus his or her recollection.224 In one study,
participants were shown a car accident between two vehicles.225
Participants were then asked to estimate the speed of the vehicles in
the accident. When the participants were asked about the speed of

217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
See Applegate, supra note 175, at 304.
See supra Part II.B.1.
Elizabeth Loftus, Memory and its Distortions, in 2 THE G. STANLEY HALL

LECTURE SERIES 123, 137 (Alan Kraut ed., 1982).
221. See generally Damaska, supra note 193; Salmi, supra note 176; Wydick, supra
note 181.
222. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 214, at 560.
223. See, e.g., Elizabeth Loftus et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information
into a Visual Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY
19 (1978); Elizabeth Loftus & John Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile
Destruction, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974).
224. See Loftus & Palmer, supra note 223, at 586.
225. Id.
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the vehicles when they “smashed” into each other, participants
reported significantly higher rates of speed than other participants
who were asked about the speed of the vehicles when they
“contacted” each other.226 A week after the experiment, the
experimenters followed up with the participants.227 The participants
were asked whether they saw any broken glass in the accident, of
which there had been none.228 The participants who were asked about
the speed of the cars using the word “smashed” were significantly
more likely to report having seen non-existent broken glass.229 The
phrasing of the question, then, not only impacted the interpretation of
the incident in terms of vehicular speed, but also permanently
affected the participants’ substantive recollection of the scene itself.
Similar experiments have reinforced these findings. For example,
after showing participants a video of a car accident, without any
broken headlights, those asked whether they saw “the” broken
headlight were more likely to report having seen it than were those
asked if they saw “a” broken headlight.230 In another study,
participants were shown a picture of a basketball player.231
Participants were then asked either “how tall” the player was or “how
short” the player was. Those asked how tall the player was reported a
significantly taller player than those asked “how short” the same
player was.232 These results were also found when questioning people
about their past personal experiences.233 For example, participants
asked about how often they had headaches while using the word
“frequently” in the question reported having three times as many
headaches as those asked the same question that used the word
“occasionally” instead.234
Questions that presuppose facts, whether intentionally or not, can
significantly impact witnesses’ recollections just as a question’s

226. Id. The witnesses reported the speeds of the vehicles differently based on the
verb used to describe the impact, with reported speeds decreasing from “smashed”,
to “collided,” “bumped,” “hit,” and “contacted,” in descending order. Id.
227. Id. at 587.
228. Id.
229. Id..
230. Loftus, supra note 214, at 562.
231. Id. at 561 (citing R. Harris, Answering Questions Containing Marked and
Unmarked Adjectives and Adverbs, 97 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 399 (1973)).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. Participants were asked either “Do you get headaches frequently, and, if
so, how often?” or “Do you get headaches occasionally, and, if so, how often?” Id.
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phrasing can.235 Participants shown footage of a car accident were
then asked whether they recalled seeing a yield sign.236 Many
participants who were not shown a yield sign but had its existence
suggested by the question ultimately recalled seeing the sign.237
Furthermore, they provided longer descriptions of the sign they never
actually saw than did those who were shown a scene with a yield
sign.238
Studies have found, however, that participants discriminate
between sources of information when accepting presupposed facts as
true. When questioning included presupposed and false facts (such as
when asked about a yield sign that didn’t exist), whether participants
remembered the presupposed facts varied based upon how biased the
provider of the presupposed facts seemed.239 In particular, where
participants were given presupposed information about a car accident
from a neutral bystander, they “remembered” the presupposed facts,
just as in previous experiments.240 When the information came from
the driver responsible for the accident, however, the witnesses did not
remember the presupposed information.241 The implication is that
people have the ability to filter information based upon the
appearance of objectivity. As a result, an attorney reading from a file
or presenting an objective perspective may have the ability to
influence a witness’s memory differently from one presenting himself
as a partisan.
With regards to presenting witnesses with evidence or other
witnesses’ testimony, empirical data presents mixed results on the
benefits and risks of creating false memories. The testimonial and
legal benefits of the practice as well as its possible impact on creating
false memories has been discussed previously.242 It is important to
note additionally that experiments have found that cued recall can
help people more fully access their stored memories, such that access
to additional information may unlock otherwise unavailable

235. See generally Loftus, supra note 223; Jonathon Schooler et al., Qualities of the
Unreal, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 175
(1986).
236. Schooler et al., supra note 235, at 175.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See David Dodd & Jeffrey Bradshaw, Leading Questions and Memory:
Pragmatic Constraints, 19 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 695 (1980).
240. Id. at 695–701.
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 180, 220 and accompanying text.
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memories.243 In one study, participants were able to recall four times
as many news stories from the previous night along with supporting
details when they were provided with the headline of the stories as a
cue as opposed to when they were asked an open-ended question
about how many stories they could recall.244
Applying these psychology experiments directly to a real world
dialogue between an attorney and client, or prosecutor and
complainant such as those described in the opening passage of this
Note, is fraught with complication.
The impact of phrasing,
presupposed facts, and cued recall doubtlessly plays a significant role
in recall and memory formation.245 Returning to our hypothetical
prosecutor and complainant, however, parsing out the impact of a
question’s phrasing from the emotional impact of having been
harassed, or from the visual stimuli surrounding the complainant as
she navigated the lobby and offices of the prosecutor’s office, is far
from straight-forward.246 For example, adrenaline and other stress
hormones have been found to impact memory during an incident,
with moderate amounts enhancing it and large amounts potentially
impairing it.247 Moreover, having experienced stalking may have
affected the complainant’s memory of prior incidents in ways that
college students wouldn’t necessarily share in a laboratory setting.248
Among the most troubling and important aspects of memory
research are the findings on how witnesses regard their own false
memories. In the words of Elizabeth Loftus, “Memory is malleable.
. . . You might relate a story to a friend but unwittingly include some

243.
244.
245.
246.

See Loftus, supra note 220, at 129–30.
Id. at 130–31.
See supra notes 222–42. See generally, Loftus, supra note 220.
See, e.g., Rick E. Ingram, External Validity Issues in Mood and Memory
Research, 4 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 57–62 (1989) (discussing external
validity issues in research on the interaction between mood and memory).
247. See NEURAL PLASTICITY AND MEMORY: FROM GENES TO BRAIN IMAGING ch.
available
at
13.3
(Federico
Bermúdez-Rattoni
ed.,
2007),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3907/.
248. Some studies have attempted to measure people’s ability to recall their own
lives in the face of questioning. Studies have identified a dynamic called “forward
telescoping,” where individuals project life events forward in their lives to correspond
to a target date range being inquired into. See Loftus, supra note 220, at 134. One
such study involved the National Crime Survey, which entails calls to individuals to
ask them about prior experiences of victimization that occurred within a given
reference period. Id. A check of prior known victimizations indicated that up to
twenty percent of victimizations reported to having occurred within the reference
period occurred before it. Id. This could have implications for witnesses trying to fit
a memory of a prior bad act into a certain time frame.
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mistaken details. Later as you attempt to recall the episode, you
might come across your memory of the scrambled recall attempt
instead of your original memory.”249 Where “you” are the witness,
and are describing what has become a false memory due to any
number of previously explored reasons, there is a significant amount
of empirical evidence suggesting that your false memories will be held
with significant confidence, even to the point of being virtually
indistinguishable from memories of actual perceptions.250
Furthermore, descriptions of false memories, or suggested objects,
are likely to be very detailed.251 The prejudicial implications are
enormous.
Cross-examination of a witness is often the defense’s best
opportunity to highlight weaknesses in a witness’s recollection and to
impeach the witness’s credibility. It is, perhaps, “the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”252 If a witness has
adopted a false memory and believes it to be true, however, a defense
attorney is significantly hindered in his ability to contradict or
impeach the witness through cross-examination, such that “[i]n the
absence of demonstrably more reliable evidence” to the testimony
being offered, “opposing lawyers will remain unable to discredit such
testimony [on cross examination] because the witness sincerely
believes the testimony is true.”253
Trial attorneys work with witnesses regularly, and by necessity
have every reason and opportunity to develop skill in distinguishing
between mendacity and honesty. Yet even the most scrutinizing
attorney may be vulnerable to a witness who describes a false
memory with as much confidence as a memory of an actual
perception, yet with even more detail. Even more problematically, at
trial, juries have been found to respond to the amount of detail and
confidence of witnesses.254
In one study, “detailed testimony
influenced judgments of guilt even when the detail was unrelated to
the culprit. . . . When eyewitnesses provided more detail, they were
generally judged to be more credible, to have better memory for the
249. Elizabeth Loftus, Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical
Implications, 4 NATURE 231 (2003).
250. Id. at 232.
251. Id.
252. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 301 n.151. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
253. Id. at 309.
254. Brad Bell & Elizabeth Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The
Power of (a Few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989).
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culprit’s face and for details, and to have paid more attention to the
culprit.”255 And these findings have been replicated, such that “many
jury studies have indicated that the ‘confidence of the witness, rather
than accuracy, [is] the major determinant of juror belief.”256 Given
that witnesses have a great deal of confidence in false memories,257
and that they report false memories with more, albeit non-sensory,
details than they do actual memories,258 the risks of juries being
swayed by falsehood are enormous. Even if people are able to prefer
genuine memories to false memories, evidence suggests that repeated
retrieval of generated or false memories may diminish that
preference.259
All hope is not lost, however. Aside from the effects of the rules of
evidence on incentivizing witness preparation, in the decades since
memory research first emerged, legal scholars have identified a
number of best practices for witness preparation that could reduce
prejudice.260 For example, beginning by asking witnesses open-ended
questions gives them a chance to provide all of the information they
can recall and it gives the attorney the chance to create a starting
point against which future changes in testimony can be measured
against to detect distortions.261 The goal of such an initial open-ended
question is to elicit a narrative from the witness.262 Then, the attorney
can identify the major parts of the narrative and cover each of them,
one by one, with open-ended questions that are not as likely to create
memory distortions.263 After the witness has thus provided a
thorough recount of each aspect of his or her recollection, it can be
useful to review the witness’s story with the witness, giving him or her
an opportunity to correct any errors or fill in any missing details.264

255. Id. at 669.
256. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 163 (quoting Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1991)).
257. Loftus, supra note 249, at 232.
258. See id.; Schooler, supra note 235, at 174.
259. See Loftus, supra note 220, at 147.
260. See generally Applegate, supra note 175; Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi,
supra note 176; Wydick, supra note 181.
261. See Wydick, supra note 181, at 48–50; Salmi, supra note 176, at 171.
262. See Wydick, supra note 181, at 48–50.
263. See id.
264. Id.
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III. ADOPTING HUDDLESTON TO REDUCE THE RISK OF
PREJUDICE
The policy goal underlying the exclusion of prior bad acts evidence
is to avoid prejudice.265 Employing a preliminary fact-finding that
requires a higher standard of proof for the commission of the acts,
however, presents a risk of introducing false testimony through
witness preparation. This Note’s focus is elucidating that risk of
prejudice, which has not been considered by courts when deciding
whether or not to adopt Huddleston.
In determining whether to admit prior bad acts evidence, courts
weigh the evidence’s prejudicial risk against its probative value by
performing a number of inquiries: whether the evidence is not overly
prejudicial because it is being offered for a reason other than to prove
criminal propensity; whether the prejudicial risk of the evidence
substantially outweighs its probative value; and, to a varying degree,
whether the prior bad acts have been proven, and thus have any
probative value.266 Ultimately, then, admissibility is governed by a
multi-step balancing of the evidence’s prejudicial risk and probative
value. Were courts to consider the risk of prejudice created by
witness preparation and interviewing, however, their determination
as to how best to reduce prejudice might lead to the broader adoption
of Huddleston.
The hypothetical prosecutor and complainant whose interaction
began this Note illustrate this possibility. Testimony as to the prior
incidents of harassment and abuse is important to explain the charged
conduct, a handful of vague phone calls to the complainant by her exboyfriend, the defendant. The calls were clearly threatening given the
nature of the relationship between the complainant and the
defendant, but absent that background, they leave more questions
than answers for a jury and don’t prove much at all. The complainant
cannot initially recall many specifics about the defendant’s prior
abusive behavior, however. After eliciting that incomplete initial
recollection during the course of interviewing and preparing the
witness, the prosecutor will then be presented with a different
situation depending upon whether the jurisdiction has adopted
Huddleston. If the jurisdiction has adopted Huddleston, then the
prosecutor has no additional incentive, beyond an overarching one to
have engaged in diligent preparation, to keep asking questions about
265. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
266. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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the witness’s incomplete memory of incidents that occurred weeks
and months in the past. Admission is not determined by the
prosecutor’s ability to prove the prior bad acts through detail and
specificity, which lends it credibility, because the testimony’s
credibility is not even considered by the trial judge.267 If the
jurisdiction has rejected Huddleston and adopted or maintained a
higher standard of proof where credibility is reserved for
consideration by judges, then the prosecutor is incentivized to follow
up with additional questions and to elicit as much specificity as the
witness can provide in the hopes of clearing the applicable evidentiary
standard.268
Of course, rehearsing testimony and gathering information from a
witness are both fundamental aspects of witness preparation.269
Further, a witness’s difficulty in providing details for important
evidence, prior bad acts or otherwise, would be explored in the course
of normal preparation by a skilled attorney270—especially if the
attorney were aware of the empirical research on the impact of detail
on jurors.271 A clear and convincing standard of evidence for the
commission of prior bad acts does not, in itself, create an entirely
unique demand for preparation that is absent under jurisdictions
adopting Huddleston. Rather, the risk of prejudice arising from
probing the limits of a witness’s memory about prior bad acts is
intrinsically bound with the subtle, lingering, and inadvertent risks of
false memories and confabulation inherent to interviewing witnesses
generally and questioning them in all but the most precise and careful
ways.272
Nonetheless, adopting Huddleston represents one
opportunity to mitigate the need for preparation on prior bad acts, at
little risk of prejudice due to the admission of prior bad acts
evidence.273 Furthermore, evaluating Huddleston in light of the
impact of witness preparation draws attention to the larger issue of

267. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
269. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
270. See generally Alcorn, supra note 178.
271. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
272. Even then, there are the concerns that the very act of interviewing alters
recollections. See Tanford, supra note 201, at 537.
273. See discussion infra Part III.A. If a jury does not believe that the defendant
committed the prior bad act, then they cannot logically be expected to hold it against
the defendant. Further, a witness’s vague or incomplete memories can be explored
on cross-examination only if the witness has not “fill[ed] in the gaps.” Loftus, supra
note 220, at 137.
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how rules of evidence place an emphasis on witness preparation that
implicitly presumes a choice courts and legislatures have made about
the lesser of prejudicial evils.274 Additionally, doing so presents an
opportunity to consider how future reconsiderations of different rules
of evidence may be elucidated by discussion of the risks inherent to
witness preparation.
Where jurisdictions have required a higher standard of proof for
prior bad acts evidence, they have cited concerns about prejudice.275
Their goals, however, are ill-served by their adoption of a higher
standard of proof. The prejudicial impact—from the creation of false
memories, of motivating prosecutors to ask additional questions, to
push the boundaries of a witness’s recollection even with the most
care and the best of intentions—outweighs the benefits of limiting
prejudice by excluding prior bad acts evidence that the prosecutor
cannot prove by clear and convincing, or even a preponderance of the
evidence.
This Part will balance the benefits of a higher standard of evidence
with the prejudice such a standard creates. This Part will first review
the benefits, and then examine the potential for prejudice created by
it. Finally, this Part will also examine the ways that adopting
Huddleston could reduce prejudice to the defendant.
A. The Minimal Benefits Requiring a Higher Standard of Proof
of Prior Bad Acts
States that have retained a higher standard of evidence for the
admission of prior bad acts have referred to the risk of prejudice
inherent in prior bad acts evidence.276 The reasoning is that prior bad
acts evidence is highly prejudicial277 and that there must be sufficient
evidence of commission to limit the risk of the admission of evidence
for which the defendant could be convicted, regardless of his
culpability for the charged conduct.278 The benefit to keeping the
evidence from the jury in the instances where it cannot be proven,
then, protects the defendant from undue prejudice. A second, related
line of reasoning offered by courts is that even if the jury does not
believe that the defendant is responsible for the conduct, the verdict
274. For a discussion of other strategies to reduce the prejudice of witness
preparation, see supra notes 265–74 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text.
277. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
278. See, e.g., State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994).
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may still be affected “regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination
of the [preliminary] fact.”279 As has been noted, however, both
arguments have been criticized, and they clearly fall apart upon closer
examination.280
The difference between FRE 104(a) and (b) is that the former
pertains to preliminary facts which condition evidence’s competence
and the latter pertains to preliminary facts which condition evidence’s
relevance.281 It is a significant distinction. If preliminary facts
conditioning competence were submitted to a jury, the jury could still
be influenced by the evidence even if it found that the evidence was
not competent. For example, it is not necessarily of any practical
consequence to a juror whether a hearsay statement is technically
admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception if it addresses a material
fact at issue. And there is a reasonable concern that if a jury were
responsible for determining such a statement’s competence, it would
be influenced by the substance of the hearsay statement regardless of
the jury’s finding as to its admissibility.282 If a jury is given evidence
and told to disregard it if there is insufficient proof that the evidence
is relevant, however, there is little reason to believe that there would
be any risk of prejudice.283 Taking the example of prior bad acts
under Huddleston, if a jury were given evidence of the conduct, but
did not find that the defendant committed the acts, it is hard to
imagine how there would be a risk of prejudice because any
reasonable juror could be expected to ignore bad acts committed by
someone other than the defendant. “[C]ommon sense and an
elementary sense of fairness should prompt even a lay juror to put
aside testimony about an act of uncharged misconduct if there is
inadequate proof that ‘the defendant was the actor.’”284
The arguments for reducing prejudice by conditioning prior bad
acts evidence’s admission on a preliminary fact-finding by a judge are
therefore marginal at best and specious at worst. There is no risk of
prejudice if the jury disregards irrelevant evidence, and there is no
empirical or logical reason to believe that the jury would be

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 822–23.
See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 9:64.
Id. at 834.
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prejudiced “regardless of [its] ultimate determination” of
commission.285
There is a risk of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
admission of allegations from multiple witnesses, none of which are
supported by much proof.286 This risk should not be overvalued,
however.287 Any risk presented by the admission of such evidence
under Huddleston could be addressed by scrutinizing the offered
evidence under Rule 403, which bars cumulative or unfairly
prejudicial evidence.288 Furthermore, under Huddleston, there would
be no risk where there was only one prior bad act, where there
weren’t numerous witnesses alleging prior bad acts, or where the
alleged prior bad acts are dissimilar.289
Finally, it is important to note that lowering the standard of
evidence for commission of the prior bad acts does not imply
lowering the overall standard of admissibility. Under Huddleston, a
court still must inquire as to whether the prior bad acts evidence is
being offered for a proper purpose and whether the probative value
outweighs any risk of prejudice.290 This protects the defendant from
evidence that would be cumulative, misleading, or confusing.291 Even
when adopting Huddleston, courts may maintain the same rigor in
scrutinizing prior bad acts evidence for its prejudicial impact, while
concomitantly mitigating one source of inadvertent memory
distortions caused during witness preparation.
B.

The Risk of False Testimony Created by Requiring Greater
Specificity by Witnesses

By rejecting Huddleston, courts run up against the risks of
prejudice inherent in witness preparation: the creation of false
testimony and the diminishment of effective cross-examination.
When there is a minimum bar for admissibility of which an attorney is
aware, there is a fundamental need to determine whether the

285. State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994).
286. See supra notes 163–65.
287. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 840–44.
288. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”)
289. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 840–43.
290. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988).
291. See United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 277 (3d Cir. 2012).
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complainant or witness is capable of providing testimony that can
clear that preliminary bar. Focusing on the issue of recollection
during witness preparation activates many sources of memory
distortion.292 For example, the attorney’s unconscious desire for the
witness to recall the prior bad acts in greater detail can lead to the
witness detecting the attorney’s goal and “fill[ing] in gaps” in the their
memory.293 This poses an obvious risk of prejudice when witnesses
testify falsely. It also poses a risk of prejudice, however, insofar as
defendants are limited in their ability to draw out the distortions in
the witness’s memory and to sufficiently impeach the witness’s
credibility.
Cross-examination has long been viewed as the mechanism for
addressing witness bias294 and for “ferreting out truth.”295 Yet it is an
imperfect tool, the efficacy of which must be questioned in light of
science’s growing knowledge of memory.296 For example, people are
susceptible to “memory hardening,” whereby once-unclear memories
can become solidified in their recollections through repeated
retrieval.297 In addition, witnesses tend to become as confident in
false memories as they are in memories based on actual perception,
and will provide more details of the former than the latter.298
C.

Witness Preparation and the Rules of Evidence: Is Adopting
Huddleston the Best Solution to a Difficult Problem?

Witness preparation remains a fundamental and universal aspect of
American litigation.299 Any prejudice resulting from the creation of
false memories certainly needs to be taken in the larger context of the
benefits witness preparation provides in purging inadmissible
statements from testimony, and in making witnesses comfortable and
able to testify completely, among other benefits.300 Although those
benefits have long been recognized, the rules of evidence and its use
of witness preparation as a first step in mitigating testimonial
292. See discussion supra Part II.B.
293. See supra note 271–72 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text.
295. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989) (quoting United States v. DiLapi, 651
F.2d 140, 149–51 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mischler, J., concurring)).
296. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 309–15.
297. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text; see also Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1987); Wydick, supra note 181, at 11.
298. See supra Part II.B.2.
299. See supra Part II.B.1.
300. Id.
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prejudice were developed in the decades before research on memory
burgeoned and created an awareness of the risks of preparation.301
The Model Rules do not provide significant guidance on witness
interviewing or preparation. For many civil or criminal defense
attorneys, a duty of zealous representation marginalizes the benefits
of scrutinizing their own clients or witnesses for any potential false
memories because it may undermine the attorney-client relationship.
However, for prosecutors, who are responsible for seeking truth,
whose witnesses bear an additional credibility through mere
association with the Government, and whose trials result in the
forfeiture of a defendant’s freedom, purging witness interviewing and
preparation of sources of false memories is a pressing concern. State
legal systems may attempt to reduce the introduction of false
memories by implementing several complementary reforms.302
Adopting Huddleston would reduce the pressure on prosecutors
and witnesses to provide details that are simply not within the powers
of recollection for the witness. In addition, providers of continuing
legal education should create and encourage attendance at lessons
that review best practices for witness preparation based on current
understandings of memory.303 Similar lessons could also be integrated
into law school curricula. Finally, best practices could be codified in
the Model Rules as the proper method of interviewing and preparing
witnesses.
Another solution may be for prosecutors to take careful note of
any changes in a witness’s testimony.304 If testimony changes as a
result of the interview in potentially substantive ways, a lawyer should
“prep it back to the way it was.”305 Recording the witness’s initial
account can aid in this process.306 Such a requirement, however,
would be deeply complicated by requirements that such records be
turned over to a defendant in criminal proceedings.307 Prosecutors are

301. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, based on debates and
practices that predated them by decades. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85. Research
on memory began developing primarily in the 1970s. See generally Loftus, supra note
220.
302. See generally Applegate, supra note 175; Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi,
supra note 176; Wydick, supra note 181.
303. For a review of some best practices, see supra notes 260–64 and accompanying
text.
304. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 173.
305. Tanford, supra note 201, at 541.
306. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 173.
307. See supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
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acutely disincentivized from recording witness’s statements for that
very reason308—the concern being that defense counsel could gain
materials with which to impeach the prosecution’s witness.309
CONCLUSION
Witness interviewing and preparation, though necessary and
beneficial, pose many risks of creating false testimony. Psychological
and legal research continue to elucidate these risks. Current
understandings of memory make it clear, however, that entirely
ethical and scrupulous practices can nonetheless result in the
distortion of a witness’s recollections. As a result, the jurisdictions
that have rejected the Court’s holding in Huddleston out of a fear of
prejudicing the defendant should instead adopt it.
Adopting
Huddleston will remove an additional incentive for prosecutors to
prepare witnesses with a focus on eliciting detail that a witness may
be incapable of recalling. Such a reform would not singularly
eliminate the prejudicial risks of even careful witness preparation.
Nonetheless, if courts were to consider the risks inherent in witness
preparation, the balance of risks would favor adopting Huddleston.

308. See Gershmann, supra note 2, at 851–53.
309. Id.

